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NECESSITY AND THE PHYSICALIST ACCOUNT IN 
ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS. 
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE RAINFALL EXAMPLE1  
– Jarosław Olesiak –
Abstract. The aim of the present article is to consider the shortcomings of the physicalist rainfall 
example set forth by Aristotle in Physics II.8. I first outline the ancient physicalist account of the 
coming-to-be of natural organisms and the accompanying rejection of the teleological character of 
such processes. Then I examine the rainfall example itself. The fundamental difficulty is that rain-
fall does not appear to have a proper nature. Hence it is not natural in the strict sense and cannot 
be used in arguments either for or against natural teleology. Rainfall can at most have an end in 
a weak sense, which makes it inadequate as a paradigm. Furthermore, the physicalist conception of 
action for an end is itself flawed. I argue that they construe it anthropomorphically and falsely 
presuppose a symmetry between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. 
Keywords: Aristotle, ancient philosophy, causality, teleology, necessity, nature, physicalism, rain-
fall example. 
Introduction 
In Physics II.8 Aristotle presents and criticizes what he takes to be the an-
cient physicalist theory of the genesis and development of natural organisms.2 Its 
proponents maintain that the material elements of such organisms are sufficient to 
determine their qualities and behavior. Aristotle argues that such an account is 
inadequate as an explanation of the genesis and features of natural substances. 
1 I would like to thank Hasse Hamalainen and Marcin Karas for looking at earlier drafts of this 
paper. I am also especially grateful for the numerous remarks and suggestions of three anonymous 
referees. 
2 Physics II.8 198b10-15. Martha Nussbaum calls the physicalist position the “Democritean chal-
lenge” and adds that “Aristotle repeatedly attacks them [his predecessors in natural science] for 
their lack of attention to formal and final explanation, insisting that form, and not matter, is the 
basic explanatory principle of living beings and their activities, and that, furthermore, the growth 
and motion of animals and plants must be explained with reference to an end-state—the mature 
functioning of the adult creature, as specified in its logos.” Nussbaum [1978] p. 61. 
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He claims that one must rather look to the fully developed living organism that is 
found only at the end of the process.3 
A part of Aristotle’s criticism of the physicalist position is found in the so-
called rainfall example, which is set forth as a paradigm of the physicalist account 
of natural coming-to-be and a refutation of the claim that nature acts for an end. 
Aristotle himself offers two explicit criticisms of the physicalist position in Physics 
II.8, one based on the existence of regularity in nature, the other on the presence of 
action for an end in nature. My purpose in the present paper is to examine the ex-
ample itself in the context of the physicalist position and to consider the value of 
the argument that it offers. In the first part of the paper I attempt to reconstruct the 
physicalist account of which the rainfall example is an illustration. In the second 
part I analyze the example itself and consider some of its shortcomings. 
The rainfall example has received quite a bit of attention in recent literature. 
It is clear that the physicalists in the argument offer rainfall as an example of 
a natural process that can be explained entirely in terms of the constituent materi-
als and their natural activities, without any recourse to final causes. It is not clear, 
however, what Aristotle’s views regarding rain were. Most of the discussion has 
thus revolved around whether he thought that rainfall has an end, and if so what 
he believed that end to be.4 
My intention in this paper is not to contribute explicitly to the above discus-
sion regarding Aristotle’s views. I believe it is philosophically interesting to ana-
lyze the rainfall example itself as a potential model for explaining all natural pro-
cesses and to uncover the structural differences between it and the phenomena 
that Aristotle clearly maintains to be fully explicable only in terms of all of the 
causes, but especially the final cause. 
The physicalist account 
In Physics II.8 Aristotle claims and attempts to show that nature, as he un-
derstands it, indeed acts for an end, and that hypothetical necessity, the kind that 
corresponds to the final cause, is the principal type found in natural coming-to-be. 
He opens the chapter by presenting these two issues: “We must discuss first why 
                                                 
3 A fair amount of research has been conducted in the last decades on Aristotle’s teleology, stimu-
lated at least in part by developments in modern biology. While there are dissenting views, nu-
merous scholars – among them Allan Gotthelf, James Lennox, and David Balme – share the view 
that according to Aristotle the teleological aspect of natural organisms is ontologically irreducible 
to the non-teleological. Cf. Gotthelf, Lennox [1987b] p. 200. 
4 Margaret Scharle offers a fairly complete overview of this discussion in: Scharle [2008]. Mariska 
Leunissen’s recent treatment of the issue is also noteworthy. See: Leunissen [2010]. 
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nature is a cause for the sake of something; then how necessity exists in physical 
things.”5 These issues are closely related to one another. For Aristotle the different 
sorts of necessity correspond to the different modes of causality, and therefore the 
kind of cause that is at work primarily in nature will determine the type of necessi-
ty that is dominant.6 
The material and moving causes as he construes them necessitate simply, 
from antecedent to consequent, though Aristotle believes causal relationships to 
be not transtemporal, but contemporaneous: a past cause, for instance, cannot, 
strictly speaking, produce or account for a future effect.7 And so, because the ma-
terials out of which something is made are now such and such, certain things nec-
essarily follow here and now: because a statue is made out of marble, it is neces-
sarily firm. Likewise, when a source of motion is acting upon something that is 
movable and there are no obstacles, movement necessarily takes place: a moving 
billiard ball necessarily causes another ball it strikes to move. 
The final cause, on the other hand, necessitates hypothetically.8 This is most 
clearly seen in the activity of a craftsman. The product he wishes to make, an idea 
or image of which he has in mind, is the final cause of the production process. It 
requires that the proper materials be present – materials with suitable natures – as 
well as the proper tools with which to work upon them. The idea or image does 
not by itself necessitate the coming-to-be of anything, but only if it is to be actual-
ized – that is, brought into actual sensible or empirical existence by an activity ini-
                                                 
5 Physics II.8 198b10-12. 
6 For a classical overview of Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes and of the teleology vs. necessity 
dispute, cf. Ross [1995] p. 74–78 and 80–83, respectively. 
7 Temporal simultaneity applies in principle to all of the causes when they are spoken of in the 
strict sense. In practice this is an issue only for the efficient cause, since it is the only cause that 
actually produces change or motion. Matter is what something is presently made of. Form express-
es just what something is now. The end might eventually pose a problem, but while it does refer to 
the effect an intrinsic efficient cause will bring about in the future, strictly speaking it is a feature 
that an object possesses now: the final cause does not itself produce motion or change. The efficient 
cause in the strict sense is always what is actually acting now. In the broad sense it is the potential 
cause, which has acted, will act, or generally can act. In this context, Jonathan Lear explains that 
“Aristotle does distinguish between the potential and the actual cause. The builder is the potential 
cause of the house, the builder building is the actual cause.” Lear [1988] p. 30. 
8 It must be noted, however, that even in a hypothetical sense the final cause does not, strictly 
speaking, act. It is the correlate of an efficient cause, which is the agency responsible for the activi-
ty. The final cause simply expresses the proper terminus of that activity. There has been much dis-
cussion in the literature about the nature of the final cause in Aristotle’s thought. In a now classic 
paper, Allan Gotthelf sets forth his influential “irreducible potential interpretation” of the final 
cause: to be for the sake of something is to possess a separate potential that is irreducible to the 
potentials of the elements out of which something, most notably a living organism, is constituted. 
Cf. Gotthelf [1976] p. 204–242. A summary of some of the initial views on the problem and of the 
nature of hypothetical necessity may be found in: Friedman [1986] p. 355–365. 
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tiated and sustained by a corresponding desire. For instance, the idea of a statue, 
the conception of the thing to be made prior to the production process, clearly 
does not necessitate that a statue be produced. Yet if an actual statue is to come to 
be, marble and tools must necessarily be present.9 
Aristotle continues with the historical motivation for the discussion: Most 
thinkers reject the view that nature acts for an end, holding instead that it acts 
by necessity: “All thinkers make reference to this cause [necessity] by saying, for 
example, that since the hot and the cold and each of such things are by nature 
of such-and-such a kind, certain other things must exist or come to be.”10 The kind 
of necessity they are referring to is simple or mechanical necessity, because they 
ascribe natural changes to the antecedent natures of what they take to be the basic 
constituents of things, such as the hot and the cold, which are either fundamental 
material parts or basic qualities of natural things.11 
Aristotle believes that a thing necessarily acts according to its nature, if 
there are no obstacles, since he defines nature as the cause or source of the specific 
activities of the thing it belongs to, and these are a necessary part of what it is to be 
a thing of a particular kind.12 It is, for example, an essential and necessary part of 
what it is to be an acorn to be able to produce an oak tree, and indeed, provided 
that the external conditions are favorable, a genuine acorn will always or for the 
                                                 
9 It must be noted, however, that Aristotle’s denial of necessity is not entirely unproblematic. Rich-
ard Sorabji considers some of the difficulties in: Sorabji [1980] p. 144 ff. 
10 Physics II.8 198b12-14. 
11 Aristotle mentions three kinds of necessity in Metaphysics V.5. One is what he elsewhere calls 
hypothetical necessity; the second is the necessity of compulsion; and the third is simple or abso-
lute (haplôs) necessity, which is the primary sense of the term. The necessity in the passage in ques-
tion here seems to be of yet another sort, which in the Posterior Analytics (II.11 94b38-95a1) he calls 
the necessity that is said to work “in accordance with a thing’s natural tendency” and could per-
haps be appropriately called natural necessity. If the list given in the Metaphysics is taken to be ex-
haustive, it would best fit into the category of simple necessity, possibly as an analogous type. In 
the physicalist context it is often well characterized as mechanical necessity. 
12 The notion of nature is obviously complex, controversial, and admits numerous interpretations. 
In a fairly simple sense, on the one hand, nature just refers to what a thing essentially is, and on the 
other, it is the internal source of a thing’s being and behaving as it does. In the first sense it ex-
presses the identity of a thing. In the second sense it would seem to have the character of an effi-
cient cause of that identity. A serious problem, which I will not consider here, is the location of 
nature as an internal source. Sean Kelsey considers some of these problems and suggests a rather 
innovative interpretation in terms of authority or power. He claims that “when Aristotle says that 
natural things have in themselves a principle of movement, he means that they have a kind of ‘au-
thority’ over their movement, title to which comes not with being its efficient cause, but with being 
its proper subject.” Kelsey [2003] p. 83–84. Margaret Scharle considers Aristotle’s views on the na-
tures of the elements and believes that, contrary to many interpretations, they have natures with 
identifiable ends. Scharle [2008]. 
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most part produce an oak. In other words, the acorn nature necessarily tends to-
ward the oak, if nothing interferes. 
The physicalist account of nature, however, involves a derivation of the 
properties and motions of natural substances – embraced by their form or nature 
– from the properties and motions of their constituent parts.13 Such substances 
clearly possess many kinds of parts. If these are themselves in turn composed of 
material parts, then their natures and properties will likewise be derivable from 
those of their constituent parts. If this process is carried to its logical conclusion, 
we arrive at the ultimate material constituents of things, which in principle have 
no further material parts and whose natures are therefore not derivable from any-
thing more fundamental. For physicalists, these are the true sources of the change 
and development of natural things. 
The above reductive analysis implies that for the physicalists, although nat-
ural things might possess natures in the sense of specific characteristics of appear-
ance and behavior, they do not possess their own per se natures in the sense in 
which Aristotle understands them, as intrinsic and proper principles of motion 
and rest. This is because the motion of any materially composite thing will always 
be explained as the result of the motions of its parts; the nature of the whole, there-
fore, is merely the sum of the natures of its parts. Only the ultimate parts, the ele-
ments, have per se natures.14 
We thus have the physicalist explanation of what the nature of a natural 
thing consists of and how it operates. The principle of motion is a peculiar kind of 
sum of the natural motions of the constituent parts. The natural thing necessarily 
moves as it does because these parts of necessity move according to their natures 
and necessarily interact with one another. In particular, there is for them no one 
single object or factor that could be identified as the nature of a complex natural 
thing. 
The physicalists, as Aristotle presents them, offer rainfall as an example of 
their account and as a paradigm for the way in which all natural processes take 
place.15 In this example they claim that rain can be explained adequately in what 
                                                 
13 Susan Sauvé Meyer argues that what is involved in the physicalist position is not so much a re-
duction of the properties of an organism to its elementary parts as an elimination of the notion of 
nature: “The rival thesis against which Aristotle defends natural teleology is not reductionism but 
a variety of eliminativism.” Meyer [1992] p. 820. 
14 Sarah Waterlow emphasizes the importance of what she calls per se natures for Aristotle’s rejec-
tion of the physicalist position: “the condition for predicating per se unity of a complex natural 
being is identical with the condition for applying teleological explanation as Aristotle understands 
it.” Waterlow [1982] p. 69–70. 
15 Physics II.8 198b17-18. 
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may be called mechanical terms and that there is no evidence that it acts for an 
end. Rain, they maintain, “does not fall in order that wheat may grow. For, one 
may say, what goes up must be cooled, and the resulting cold water must come 
down.”16 So according to them rain comes to be by necessity. Its motion is ex-
plained in terms of the necessary natural motions of its constituent parts, air and 
water. These parts themselves do have natural motions. In this case they are ele-
ments, whose natures and motions are fundamental and belong to them immedi-
ately and necessarily. 
With the benefit of basic modern natural science, we can obviously supply 
a more complete mechanistic account of how rain comes about. It is interesting 
because of its overall similarity to the ancient physicalist account, being thus a sort 
of confirmation of it. Generally speaking, the heat of the sun acting on water nec-
essarily causes it to become warm and evaporate.17 It is likewise a necessary prop-
erty of water vapor, which is a mixture of water and air, to rise when heated. 
Moreover, since the temperature of the atmosphere decreases with increasing alti-
tude and the atmospheric pressure decreases, as the heated water vapor rises it 
necessarily cools. It is also a necessary property of water vapor to condense into 
water when cooled. Finally, the water which is formed in this way is denser than 
the surrounding air and hence necessarily falls. 
If a natural object behaves as it does because it must, it appears counterintu-
itive to ask what it sought as an end. Something analogous to this can be found in 
human situations. Someone who has been physically forced is not asked why he 
acted as he did, since he clearly did not want to perform the action. He did not act 
with any goal in mind, and the presence of such a goal is generally considered to 
be what it is to have an end in the sense of a purpose. Why, the physicalists ask, 
cannot the same be true of natural things? After all, just as action in the case of 
coercion can be explained entirely by an antecedent moving cause,18 so too in the 
case of rain the movement also seems capable of being explained by its antecedent 
moving causes – not by a desire for what followed, the growth of the corn. And so 
the physicalists maintain that, after it has rained 
                                                 
16 Physics II.8 198b18-20. 
17 Aristotle held that the basic elements could be transformed into one another. Water could be 
transformed into air by the action of heat and back into water by cooling. See: Ross [1995] p. 107. 
18 Here the cause is construed in the broad potential, as opposed to the strict actual, sense. 
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[...] the growth of the corn just happens; similarly, if a man’s wheat is spoiled on 
the threshing floor, rain did not fall for the sake of spoiling the wheat, but this just 
happened.19 
While the rain falls by necessity, it is by coincidence or by chance that the corn 
grows as a result of rainfall.20 They hold that if rain indeed fell precisely in order 
to make the corn grow, it would never cause the corn to spoil. Yet in fact rainfall 
does sometimes cause corn to spoil. We cannot, therefore, maintain that it falls for 
the sake of growth, any more than we can say that it falls for the sake of spoilage. 
It rains because it must and its consequence, whether growth or spoilage, is coin-
cidental: there is nothing desire-like in the nature of rain that inclines it more to-
ward the one rather than the other. 
Aristotle’s physicalists claim that the rainfall example is a paradigm for the 
way in which all natural things behave, not for an end but by necessity. Organ-
isms in their entirety are made up of elementary parts with natures that they obey 
necessarily. Any particular arrangement of these parts absolutely necessitates 
what follows. Applying this to nature in general they ask: 
[...] what should prevent the parts in nature, too, from coming to be of necessity in 
this manner, for example, the front teeth of necessity coming out sharp and so fit 
for tearing but the molars broad and useful for grinding food?21 
The teeth here are said to be as they are because of the interactions of the parts out 
of which they came to be. These came together in a particular way because of their 
necessary motions and when together they acted upon one another to produce 
teeth. Because the parts were moving and acting necessarily, the teeth necessarily 
came out as they did. It is not the case that the animal needed sharp teeth in front 
and flat ones in back in order to survive and therefore produced such teeth. In-
stead, teeth simply came out as they did with mechanical necessity and happened 
to be of the sort that proved useful for eating and hence for survival. 
 In Physics II.9 Aristotle offers another illustration of how the physicalist ac-
count works, intended to show the difficulties involved in their doctrine. The 
                                                 
19 Physics II.8 198b20-23. 
20 Aristotle’s notions of coincidence and chance are presented in Physics II.5 and 6. Waterlow sum-
marizes his position as follows: “[Aristotle uses] ‘coincidence’, and also ‘by chance’ and ‘by spon-
taneity’, to refer (a) to a set of simultaneous phenomena each of which has an independent ante-
cedent cause, and (b) to the (desirable) outcome of the concurrence. […] ‘coincidence’ means only 
that the result represents a convergence of mutually independent diachronic causal lines.” 
Waterlow [1982] p. 76. 
21 Physics II.8 198b24-26. 
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physicalist view, he says, locates necessity “in generation”. Aristotle argues that it 
is as if one were to explain that a wall comes to be because of the natural motions 
of its parts rather than through the activity of a builder: the stones are necessarily 
carried downward to the foundation because they are heaviest; the earth, out of 
which bricks are made, being lighter, forms the walls; and the wood, which is 
lightest, is carried upward to form the roof. And so the entire complex structure 
comes to be necessarily through the actions of the simple elements.22 
So far the ancient physicalist account is remarkably similar to what modern 
science proposes: that nature and natural things work very much like complex 
mechanical systems whose parts act upon one another and by this type of interac-
tion bring about the whole organism and are responsible for its activity. The 
ancient physicalists, however, inject an element which later physicalists would 
restrict only to certain contexts. They hold that natural things universally – that is, 
not merely kinds, but even individuals – come to be and behave not only by ne-
cessity but also by coincidence.23 The difference between the ancient and modern 
accounts surfaces in the explanation of the ordinary coming-to-be of individual 
organisms, as opposed to the initial genesis of kinds. Coincidence makes sense 
now only when accounting for the original evolutionary coming to be of kinds, not 
that of individuals of a given kind once constituted. The ancient physicalists ap-
pear to have conflated the two processes; in the passage at hand Aristotle explicit-
ly addresses and objects to their explanation of the latter. 
The reason for introducing coincidence is clear: necessity alone does not 
suffice to explain how natural organisms come to be (both in the ancient and in the 
modern accounts). Although the elements do move necessarily, there is clearly no 
necessity that they enter into any particular combination with other elements so as 
to produce any definite organism. While the natures of the elements do necessitate 
simple motions, they do not necessitate anything more than these motions: noth-
ing in the nature of water or air necessitates rain at any particular time, nor is it 
part of the nature of earth to form teeth. 
And so the physicalists explain that when the elements are in isolation they 
move independently of one another. During these random motions some elements 
                                                 
22 “Nowadays it is thought that what exists by necessity does so in generation, as if one were to 
consider the wall as having been constructed by necessity, since what is heavy travels down by its 
nature and what is light travels up by its nature, and so the stones and the foundations are down, 
then earth right above because it is lighter, and finally wood at the very top since it is the lightest.” 
Physics II.9 200a1-5. 
23 “the front teeth of necessity […] [come] out sharp and so fit for tearing but the molars broad and 
useful for grinding food, not however for the sake of this but by coincidence. […] [And similarly] 
with the other parts in which final cause seems to exist.” Physics II.8 198b24-29. 
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combine by chance to form more complex substances. The product of the combi-
nation has no single proper cause, since it is the result of multiple independent 
causal sequences.24 As a result of further similar interactions ever more complex 
substances are produced. Eventually, living organisms will be produced. Most of 
these, having been produced randomly, will be monstrosities and will perish. On-
ly those that are put together suitably will survive: 
[...] whenever all the parts came together as if generated for the sake of something, 
the wholes which by chance were fitfully composed survived, but those which 
came together not in this manner, like the man-faced offspring of oxen mentioned 
by Empedocles, perished and still do so.25 
The above is a sketch of the ancient physicalist explanation of the existence of 
parts of animals such as teeth. They came to be by a combination of necessity and 
coincidence. The elements out of which they came to be acted necessarily and co-
incided to yield these particular teeth. The reason why an animal with a particular 
set of teeth exists, they say, is that its teeth were well-adapted for eating and there-
fore allowed the animal that possessed them to survive. Other kinds of teeth also 
came to be, yet because they were not suitable for chewing the animals that pos-
sessed them perished. 
 Coincidence is an important element in the ancient physicalist account of 
natural things; yet it does in fact appear to make it impossible to speak about the 
final cause. For if something came to be by coincidence it would seem to have no 
proper cause at all, whether final or moving. Things which came to be in this way, 
such as teeth, only appear to be for an end because they indeed are of use and 
serve the organism. They did not, however, come to be explicitly for that purpose. 
 The ancient physicalist account, while conceptually similar to the modern 
explanation of the evolutionary genesis of kinds, does not make it clear how 
such kinds reproduce themselves once constituted. Aristotle’s objection to the 
physicalist account is thus fully justified in this regard.26 He obviously takes 
                                                 
24 See note 8 above for Aristotle’s understanding of chance and coincidence. Waterlow explains that 
“Empedocles and the other physikoi are […] portrayed by Aristotle as saying that organisms and 
their complex organic parts have come about through sets of independent causal processes involv-
ing separate material factors which behave and undergo transformation by the necessity of their 
own natures, and which merely happen to occur together, since none occurs because any of the 
others do, or through the same cause.” Waterlow [1982] p. 76–77. 
25 Physics II.8 198b29-33. 
26 James Lennox points out that Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation and the examples he 
considers might pose a problem for his criticism of the physicalists: “It has been claimed that, un-
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the physicalist account to be an attempt to explain the genesis of individuals of an 
already existing kind. As such, this account is clearly flawed. The nature of coinci-
dence is such that its individual products are irregular and occur rarely. Statistical-
ly speaking, viable combinations can, to be sure, come to be in large populations 
and over large periods of time. Yet the appearance of such stable combinations of 
more elementary substances is statistically extremely rare. Such coming-to-be is 
not what Aristotle is considering in the passage in question.27 The regular repro-
duction of individuals, such as what in principle occurs whenever sexual activity 
takes place, is not explicable by means of the coincidental conjunction of elements, 
but requires an explicit principle internal to the new organism. The only possible 
reasonable source of such a principle, to Aristotle’s empirically oriented mind, are 
the parent organisms. The general name he gives to this principle is nature. Be-
cause the principle is correlative to the fully developed organism that it is respon-
sible for bringing into existence, it is claimed by him to act precisely for the sake of 
that fully developed organism. 
 The obvious question that arises here is to what extent Aristotle’s presenta-
tion of the physicalist view is accurate. It is in fact not entirely clear how broadly 
the physicalists intended to apply their account, whether it was meant to explain 
only the original coming-to-be of species or whether it also applied to the genera-
tion of each individual.28 An examination of some of the original textual fragments 
– of Empedocles, for example – seems to suggest that he is giving a cosmogony 
and a zoogony, accounts of the original coming to be of the cosmos and of living 
organisms.29 If this is the case, then the physicalists’ account is limited because it 
does not explain the more common natural phenomenon of the generation of in-
dividuals from parents. Yet there is textual evidence, albeit limited, that the ac-
                                                                                                                                                    
like his theory of sexual generation, Aristotle’s account of spontaneous generation is inconsistent 
with his metaphysical doctrines of causation and chance.” Cf. Lennox [1982] p. 220. 
27 Aristotle does not consider the original genesis of kinds, since he appears to have believed in an 
eternal generation of organisms having the same form, and hence that kinds and species always 
existed. Cf. Lennox [2001] p. 131. However, for Aristotle, a viable, reproducing organism that came 
to be by a chance combination of elements would in principle have an end, the fully developed 
individual (together with its reproductive capacity). I would claim that even a hypothetical one- 
-time organism, which came to be by chance and lived on to maturity but failed to reproduce itself, 
would on Aristotelian principles have an end, a one-time end in this case. The end in each case is 
the fully developed form of the individual, insofar as this form is the result of an internal efficient-
causal mechanism. 
28 Although Aristotle does say that wholes like the man-faced offspring of oxen continue to perish, 
it is not evident whether he means that this is a regular phenomenon or only an occasional one. 
29 Cf. Kirk, Raven, Schofield [1983] p. 299–305. 
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count is also meant to explain individual coming-to-be.30 If this, however, was also 
intended by them, then all coming-to-be, including the propagation of species, is 
clearly coincidental. 
Aristotle does not himself make any explicit distinction between the two 
cases and in his first criticism of the physicalists’ position he attributes the second 
interpretation to them.31 In fact, this appears to have been the position held by one 
of the physicalists, Empedocles. He seems to explain all coming-to-be in terms of 
necessity and coincidence, both the original genesis of living things from the ele-
ments and all subsequent generations from previously existing individuals.32 
Empedocles believed that in the original formation of the world, the parts 
of living things, limbs, organs, etc., were formed first by the coincidence of the el-
ements. In a later stage these organic parts themselves began to interact and com-
bined to form animals and monsters of various sorts.33 
He held, moreover – and this is undoubtedly astounding to the modern 
reader – that something similar takes place in every generation of offspring from 
parents. The embryo is formed by the union of tiny bodily members drawn 
from every part of the parents’ bodies during sexual union. These combine ran-
domly and again only certain combinations survive and appear. Here too, because 
it is the result of coincidence, the product cannot be said to be for an end.34 
The above combination of necessity and coincidence, which in Aristotelian 
terms amounts to a combination of the material and moving causes, is thus 
claimed by the ancient physicalists to explain all natural coming-to-be and to ren-
der reference to ends and their associated forms superfluous. 
                                                 
30 Cf., for example, Empedocles fragment 380. Kirk, Raven, Schofield [1983] p. 304. 
31 “Yet it is impossible for things to come to be in this manner; for the examples cited and all things 
by nature come to be either always or for the most part, but none of those by luck or chance do so 
likewise.” Physics II.8 198b34-36. 
32 According to Balme, Aristotle criticizes Empedocles not for merely maintaining that the fittest 
survive, but for claiming that they have become fit to survive by chance and the random activity of 
material causes. Cf. Balme [1987] p. 280. 
33 Richard Sorabji gives a sketch of Empedocles’ account: “Empedocles suggested that there were 
four stages in zoogony, the development of animals on the earth. First, individual organs arose out 
of the earth, heads without necks, arms bereft of shoulders, eyes in want of foreheads. Secondly, 
the members coalesced into monstrous unions, shambling creatures with countless hands, man- 
-fronted ox-types, ox-headed man-types, part male, part female. Thirdly, in a single long night, 
primitive creatures sprang out of the earth complete, first trees, then primitive humans.” Sorabji 
[1980] p. 176. 
34 Sorabji explains that “an embryo is formed, in his view, through tiny members being drawn from 
all over the parents’ bodies in the excitement of union, and assembled in the form of seed in the 
womb of the mother. The embryos are nourished through blood and air being delivered in four 
tubes. The whole process provides opportunities for monstrosities to be formed once again.” 
Sorabji [1980] p. 176–177. 
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Difficulties with the physicalist position. The rainfall example 
We have seen that in support of their position the physicalists propose the 
example of rainfall. Let us now consider this example in more detail and identify 
some of the difficulties that the ancient physicalist account entails when taken at 
face value.35 The physicalists, as Aristotle presents them, claim that all natural 
things come to be after the manner of rain, which takes place with mechanical 
necessity. However, a comparison of rainfall with examples of natural things such 
as living organisms reveals significant differences in their characteristics and be-
havior. 
First of all, natural things seem to have within themselves principles of rest 
and motion: there is something in them, which Aristotle calls “nature”, that initi-
ates, directs, and terminates motion. Anything that moves but does not possess 
such an inner principle cannot be considered to be natural per se. The singular 
– “a principle” – is very important here. Natural things, insofar as they are natural 
in the strict sense, possess one internal principle of activity. The unity of this prin-
ciple is made manifest in the unity of the activity for which it is responsible; in 
each particular instance of a given organism of the same kind, the developmental 
and vital activities are the same. An example of a natural thing is an acorn. After it 
has fallen to the ground it will initiate its own growth from within (external condi-
tions may trigger and sustain its inner development, but they do not direct it). 
After it has sprouted, a principle within the sapling will continue to direct its 
growth until it reaches maturity. Then the same principle will cause the tree 
to stop growing. In all of these changes something “within” the organism directs it 
to use external materials for its own development. 
In the case of rain there is no evidence for the existence of such an internal 
principle. Instead, there is a multiplicity of principles at work, identical in kind. 
The large-scale behavior of rain is a sum of the activities of the water-parts of 
which it consists, which act and interact in relative independence. In the rain cycle 
as a whole, however, the sum of water-parts is driven or directed entirely by fac-
tors external to the materials undergoing motion, factors such as heat and cold, 
altitude, and wind. The ascent of water vapor, for example, while it is indeed nat-
ural, is due primarily to the action of heat upon it rather than to an inner source of 
motion that is somehow distinct from the water-parts themselves.36 The natural 
                                                 
35 Physics II.8 198b16-23. 
36 The structure of the water-parts is distinct from the water-parts themselves, yet the result of this 
structuring is still water. What happens when liquid water turns into water vapor, i.e. turns into 
what bears the external appearance of air? The water has in a sense – phenomenally – disappeared 
and in its place air has appeared. 
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upward motion of water is brought about directly by the external factors. Only the 
nature of water is at work, present in each of the water-parts and through them in 
the water-whole; no new nature of the water-whole is at work. We cannot really 
say here, as we can in the case of the acorn and of the tree, that external circum-
stances are merely conditions for the change. Quite the contrary, they are precisely 
what initiated the motion; the water does not make use of heat for its development 
into water vapor and then into rain in the way a tree exploits external materials for 
its growth, or even in the way that it uses solar energy, which propels photosyn-
thesis. 
Moreover, although the heated water vapor is acting according to its nature 
when it rises (in perhaps a less strict sense – for the ancient physicalists would 
claim that it is the fire – i.e. heat – in it that causes the rising), water would not be-
come vapor nor tend to rise without the action of heat from the outside, whereas 
a tree does possess an inherent tendency to grow, which can at most be frustrated 
by the absence of appropriate external factors such as nutrients, light, and heat. 
Then, when the water vapor has reached a certain altitude it both ceases to rise 
and begins to condense. Although these two activities are also natural to water, in 
the sense that water in the form of vapor normally behaves in this way under the-
se conditions and such behavior is part of what it is to be water, they are actually 
caused or triggered in a direct way by external factors, the altitude of the water 
vapor and the accompanying absence of heat. Here again it is not the water vapor 
that initiates the change, but something external. 
The above considerations show that the rain cycle is not a natural process 
strictly speaking because it does not have within itself the source of its own specif-
ic motion. It does not have a proper nature and hence cannot be used as a model 
for things that do.37 
We have noted one difference between rain and natural things by consider-
ing the sources of the motions of each. Another difference is present in the motions 
themselves. Those of living things insofar as they are alive, and more generally, 
of natural things insofar as they are natural, are essentially different from those of 
their constituents. The motions of the elements are simple (fire rises, earth falls, 
                                                 
37 A physicalist would probably not accept the internal-external distinction. Yet I believe that it is 
a valid distinction, overlooked by the physicalists and recognized by Aristotle, and very important 
for him. There is a significant difference between the two processes. Aristotelian substances, and 
especially organic systems, possess a unity of being and behaving that is not present in non-
substantial natural phenomena such as rainfall. The physicalists, however, are proposing the latter 
as a model for the former. 
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etc.), while those of the whole organism are complex and articulated.38 We have 
only to consider the nutritive and sensitive activities of plants and animals to rec-
ognize the difference between them and simple bodies. 
In the case of rain the motions of the whole do not differ in kind from those 
of the constituent material parts. Water evaporates, the vapor rises and condenses 
as it cools, etc. These motions are the simple sums of the motions of the constituent 
elements of the rain cycle and are themselves simple. At no point do we find any 
activity different in kind from those of water or air. It is therefore clear that there is 
nothing more at work than air and water. Once again, we see that rainfall does not 
have its own nature. In natural things, however, because there are motions differ-
ent in kind from those of the constituents, we must conclude that there is some-
thing more at work than merely the elements. This extra factor is what Aristotle 
calls their nature. 
The above differences between the internal structure and motions of natural 
things on the one hand and those of rain on the other show that the latter cannot 
be adequate as a model for the way in which natural things behave. 
Another difficulty is that the physicalist criticism of the claim that natural 
things act for the sake of something seems to be founded upon a confusion be-
tween natural end-directed processes and human action for an end. By introduc-
ing characteristics of human activity into the account, they anthropomorphize 
natural activity. 
A distinction can in fact be made between specifically human action for an 
end (action for a purpose) and natural activity for an end.39 They are both instanc-
es of the more general phenomenon of action for the sake of something, whose 
                                                 
38 The point here is that an account in terms of the motions of the elements, which is relatively suc-
cessful in describing phenomena such as rainfall, cannot be used to describe with any accuracy and 
precision the activities of complex organisms. Rainfall consists only of the motions, and eventually 
the cyclical transformations, of a single element: water, which turns into air, rises, cools, and then 
again becomes water and falls. The full description of complex objects and their corresponding 
activities, even if they materially consist of and come to be from elements, require the use of differ-
ent, non-elemental terms. The most important of these terms, for example ‘oak’, makes reference to 
the fully developed organism that comes to be at the end of a developmental process. Such expres-
sions cannot be adequately reformulated in terms of elemental language. 
39 Human end-directed activity can obviously be divided into production, which results in artifacts, 
and action, which does not result in any material product. In the present paper I am restricting 
myself for analytic purposes to the former because of its greater resemblance to the natural com-
ing-to-be that the physicalists are attempting to explain. Of course, human practical non- 
-productive activity also has a strictly natural aspect. Aristotle first of all claims that man by nature 
desires to know (Metaphysics I.1) and furthermore he believes that everything that human beings 
do, including seeking knowledge, is embedded in the general natural human activity of seeking 
happiness (Nicomachean Ethics I). The seeking is naturally necessary for him and is a part of what 
he is, but the satisfaction of that desire is not. 
Jarosław Olesiak ◦ Necessity and the physicalist account in Aristotle’s “Physics.” Difficulties... 
 49 
essential feature, I would claim, is the existence of an ordered temporal sequence 
of states of affairs leading to a state that has the character of a completion with 
respect to them, regardless of whether that agent is a human being or a non- 
-human natural object.40 
While the above feature is common to the two kinds of action for the sake of 
something, human action for an end differs from natural both in the manner in 
which the end is present during the process and in the relationship between the 
final product and the source of its being. In human activity the end, the state of 
affairs whose physical and empirical instantiation is desired, is present as an idea 
in the mind of the agent, either in the form of a sensible image in the imaginative 
faculty or in conceptual form, as a verbally articulated object. Furthermore, this 
object is freely and explicitly chosen: it is not simply a result of the spontaneous 
development of the agent and it need not be chosen. And so Socrates’ going to the 
market to purchase groceries or his engaging in the production of sculptures is not 
a part of his development as a human being, nor does it follow from his being 
human. The final product is extrinsic to the agent; that is, it is not related to what 
a human being is as such. Because of these two qualities, being an object of choice 
and being extrinsic, the end does not always come about; it does so only when it is 
desired and there are no obstacles to bringing it about. There is no necessity, for 
example, that Socrates make a statue, for it comes to be as a result of his choice 
and is not a necessary consequence of his nature in the way that, say, the activities 
of choosing and judging are. 
In natural action for an end, on the other hand, the final state of affairs, the 
end, is not freely and explicitly chosen by natural things insofar as they are natu-
ral, but follows necessarily from their natures, in the sense that it is a part of what 
it is to be a thing of a given kind. As a result, they take place always or for the 
most part.41 The acorn clearly does not choose to become a tree but does so from 
a sort of inner necessity, if there are no obstacles.42 The final product of natural 
activity, however, is intimately related to what the natural thing is as such. It is the 
perfect or accomplished state of the thing itself and, in some sense, of its seed, 
                                                 
40 Cf. Bradie and Miller for a partial formulation of this interpretation in their discussion of the 
nature of the final cause. Bradie, Miller [1984] p. 136. John Cooper offers an alternative interpreta-
tion of the final cause in terms of the good. For him a goal, whether natural or not, is the good that 
some other agency produces or makes possible, acting precisely because of that good. Cooper 
[1982] p. 197. 
41 This is a common thesis of Aristotle. See, for example, Physics II.8 198b34-36. 
42 The acorn which is incapable of producing a tree because of a defect is not fully an acorn. It is 
one in the sense that it is the fruit of an oak, but it fails to be an acorn in the full sense because it 
does not have within itself a principle that is capable of generating a new oak. 
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which is the same in kind and perpetuates it. The natural end of the acorn and of 
the sapling is the mature tree and the acorns produced by it, both of which are 
identical in kind to the original acorn. Indeed, the entire transtemporal process 
leading from acorn to oak and back again to acorn constitutes a peculiar unity and 
is itself an integral super-temporal object. In fact it is in some sense what we un-
derstand by the terms ‘acorn’ or ‘oak’, which literally and superficially refer only 
to particular parts of the transtemporal whole. 
In the physicalist criticism of the view that nature acts for an end, the pecu-
liar and problematic character of the rainfall example presented above becomes 
even more obvious. To show that nature and natural things do not act for an end 
but of necessity, the physicalists propose rain as a counterexample: rain does not 
fall in order to achieve any end; it does so simply because it must.43 One is led by 
this counterexample to suppose that rain was proposed by some as an example of 
a natural process that is for the sake of something, and the physicalists’ objection 
suggests that this end was the growth of wheat (hopôs ton siton auxêsê).44 According 
to the physicalists, however, this cannot be the case because rain sometimes causes 
wheat to spoil; hence they expect the end always to follow the thing whose end 
it is. 
The peculiar problem here is that both the example and the counterexample 
are based upon a weak sense of natural action for an end. Rain, as we have seen, 
does not have a proper nature, that is, one inner principle of behavior, though it 
can be said to have a nature in the general sense, insofar as it is a stably occurring 
and easily identifiable reality, and it can likewise be called natural insofar as it is 
indeed a natural phenomenon, if this is construed in contradistinction to the 
products of human agency. Rain, however, is quite different from simple inani-
mate natural things and even more so from living organisms, such as the oak con-
sidered above. It is a relatively homogeneous collection of loosely connected parts, 
water combined with air. It therefore possesses nothing resembling what may be 
proposed as the almost trivial end of inanimate natural substances: persistence, 
simply continuing to be what they are – what persists is the water (liquid or va-
por) that underlies it.45 Rain all the more so does not possess any end analogous to 
that of the acorn and oak or of other living organisms, i.e. their intrinsic develop-
                                                 
43 Physics II.8 198b16-19. 
44 Physics II.8 198b18. 
45 This is the case because of themselves they are not in the process of becoming anything more; 
that is, they are not in potency with respect to any further intrinsic actualization. 
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ment and specific perpetuation, the analogue for them of the trivial continued ex-
istence of inanimate substances.46 
In the case of rain we have at most a weak sense of action for an end, 
though even here the physicalist objection is misplaced. The rain contributes to 
something other than itself; hence the rain and the wheat are extrinsically related. 
Furthermore, they are related not because rain is the natural phenomenon that it 
is, but ultimately because rain consists of water. Wheat, like every other plant, 
needs water to live and develop. Yet it does not need water simply, that is, with-
out qualification; it needs the proper amount of water, and this amount is relative 
to the kind of plant it is and to its current circumstances. Rain does of necessity 
provide water – because it is water – but it does not of necessity provide the prop-
er amount of water. The amount of water that falls is not fitted to wheat or to any-
thing else it falls upon in the way that the acorn is fitted to the oak that comes to 
be from it. This is due precisely to the extrinsic relationship between them; in this 
sense it does not rain in order (in the strong sense) that the wheat may grow. So 
far the physicalists are right: if we require a direct correlation between an object 
and its end – and no such correlation exists in this case – rain cannot be said to 
have an end. 
Yet in a weaker sense of being for the sake of something – and such a sense 
can with justification be applied to rain insofar as it is a weak example of 
a natural thing – rain can be said to be for the sake of the growth of the wheat. 
If a natural end is construed, on the interpretation of Aristotle presented here, 
as any actuality that results from a thing as such, we can indeed say, with the 
aforementioned qualifications, that the growth of wheat crops is the end of rain, 
for growth is an actuality that results from rain as such, that is, precisely insofar as 
it is rain (a significant amount of water falling upon a significant expanse). And 
here the physicalists are mistaken. 
                                                 
46 Someone might object that the physicalist does not need to make use of ends, even in a weak 
sense, in his explanations, and indeed is not even interested in them. He has only to account for 
regularity, and he believes that such an account can fully well be given in purely mechanical terms, 
making reference only to the materials and their interactions. Such objections tend to treat ends as 
competing active factors. Yet Aristotelian ends, I would maintain, are not directing forces. They are 
just the proper results of the regular activity of such directing forces. Where we can identify one 
such “force” we have a strong and proper result or end. Where several such active factors are at 
work in a relatively uncoordinated fashion, as is the case with rainfall, we have a weak result or 
end. In objects that have substantial unity, we can indeed identify such a force. An example is the 
complex and unitary biochemical mechanism that is responsible for the development of an oak. 
Such a mechanism cannot be spoken about without mentioning, and in the first place, the terminus 
of its activity, the fully developed oak. Properly understood, ends are not in conflict with mechani-
cal causes, but rather serve as their indispensable complements. 
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The mistake of the physicalists in this case is obvious. First of all, they have 
chosen to argue against an improper example of nature and natural action for an 
end. The relationship between the end and the object they have selected is extrin-
sic and to a certain degree accidental, in the sense that not the water itself, but the 
amount of water that falls when it rains is incidental to what the wheat needs at 
the time. Yet most natural things, and in particular living organisms, are quite un-
like rain. And so while their objection partially holds in the case of rain, it does not 
serve as an objection against natural teleology in general. 
Secondly, even the partial truth of their objection is not to their credit, be-
cause the reason why rain does not have a natural end in the strong sense, given 
above, is not contained in their argument against teleology. The argument that 
they offer is in fact false. They presuppose a symmetry between growth and spoil-
age, as if these two resulting states of affairs were equivalent. According to them, 
because rain sometimes causes crops to spoil, we might just as well argue that it 
rains for the sake of spoilage.47 Yet clearly, they continue, we do not. And so, be-
cause both states of the wheat, its growth and its spoilage, follow upon the falling 
of rain in what they presuppose to be equivalent ways, and in the second case we 
do not maintain the existence of any action for the sake of something, we ought 
not to maintain it in the first case either. Both states just follow, without there be-
ing anything in the rain that directs it to one or the other. 
Yet growth and spoilage are clearly and eminently not symmetric or equiv-
alent states, just as being and non-being are not. One is a coming-to-be of some-
thing, the other is a ceasing-to-be. One is the acquisition of actuality and reality, 
the other is its loss. For Aristotle a natural end, as interpreted above, is always the 
actuality, i.e. the being, that results from a thing as such. The end in the sense of 
the telos is never a destruction. Furthermore, while an intelligent agent can indeed 
purposely destroy something, yet even in such a case it can be argued that this is 
done for the sake of a positive end that is seen as achievable through such a de-
struction. This is not the case with mere spoilage. 
Next, as indicated above, the physicalist interpretation of teleology appears 
to be anthropomorphic. That is, the physicalists seem to take human goal-directed 
activity as the paradigm of action for an end in general. In this context, their objec-
tion takes on a new light and indeed seems to be justified. The original Greek that 
introduces the physicalists’ argument is all’ hôsper huei ho Zeus.48 In English ver-
sions of this passage ho Zeus is either not translated at all (Apostle’s translation: 
                                                 
47 Physics II.8 198b21-23. 
48 Physics II.8 198b17-18. 
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“as in the case of rain, which does not fall”)49 or it is rendered as “sky” (the Oxford 
Translation: “but just as the sky rains”)50, which is indeed one of the possible fig-
urative translations. Yet literally it refers to the deity. In either case the sky or Zeus 
is taken to be the agency responsible for rain. If this agency, in the physicalist un-
derstanding, did indeed act for the sake of the growth of the wheat when it pro-
duced rain, having the good of the wheat in mind, so to speak, then like a good 
gardener, it would produce rain in accordance with the needs of the wheat. 
Because it does not produce rain in this manner, there is no such agency. And if 
the activity of such an agency is identified with action for an end, then there is no 
action for an end in nature.51 
For Aristotle, however, teleology involves an intrinsic relationship between 
a thing and its end, as we have in the case of an acorn and an oak, and even, in 
a weaker sense, in the case of water in general and the growth of plants in general 
(since it is not by accident that water contributes to the growth of plants). Such an 
intrinsic relationship exists both in natural coming-to-be when a true nature is at 
work and in intelligence-directed coming-to-be where the desire for the final 
product or state of affairs is intrinsically related to what in fact is coming to be. 
The example that the physicalists propose as paradigmatic combines 
incompatible features, one that is typical of non-intentional natural activity for an 
end and one that is characteristic of intentional human action for an end. First of 
all, they expect necessity of ends: the product in natural processes that would 
qualify as teleological would have to follow always or necessarily, which is an at-
tribute of non-intentional natural activity for an end. In order for rain to satisfy 
this requirement, it would have to cause wheat always to grow and never to spoil, 
i.e. to be an end in the strong sense. However, they propose a situation that could 
never even hope to satisfy this requirement. The final product, the growth 
of wheat, is independent of the nature of rain and could therefore at most be an 
end in the weak sense. Having an end that is independent of the nature or essence 
of the substance that is acting is typical of intentional action for an end and is an 
end in the weak sense. Thus, if nature were indeed to be something that acted for 
an end, they would expect rainfall (1) to produce wheat always, in the same way 
                                                 
49 Apostle [1980]. 
50 Barnes [1991]. 
51 While Aristotle does argue for the existence of a prime mover of the universe, he does not attrib-
ute to this mover any direct role in producing changes in the sublunar domain. Cf. Balme [1987] 
p. 277. Cooper maintains that “Aristotle, unlike other teleologists of nature (Plato, the medievals, 
Leibniz), finds goal-directedness in natural processes without feeling any need at all to find inten-
tions (whether God’s or, somehow or other, nature itself’s) lying behind and explaining it.” Cooper 
[1982] p. 221. 
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that an acorn always produces an oak or a human being always gives birth to 
another human being and (2) to produce something that intrinsically has nothing 
to do with what it is, in the same way that a human being produces first a table 
and then a stool. Their example is therefore a priori flawed. It could never hope to 
be teleological in the strict sense. 
Whatever might be the status of their theoretical position, it is evident that 
at least the example they have chosen is not suitable to illustrate it. Indeed, it com-
promises their position, since presumably it was chosen precisely to support that 
position and refute the competing position. Not only does the example not satisfy 
their criteria for being something that acts for an end in the strict or strong sense, 
but in fact it could not satisfy anyone’s criteria. The reason is that rain is not a nat-
ural thing in the strict sense and therefore does not have a proper natural end. Yet, 
even more importantly, because their criteria demand that natural things have 
both human and non-human qualities, very few things, if any at all, could possibly 
satisfy them, and certainly not most of the things that we would accept as natu-
ral.52 
Conclusion 
In the ancient physicalist account, then, as Aristotle presents it, invoking 
a final cause seems absurd and unnecessary. If everything comes to be through the 
interaction of the material elements and these act necessarily and interact random-
ly, then it would seem that reference to a final cause is superfluous. The rainfall 
example is intended to show this. Rain falls when it does because it must and the 
results, positive (growth) or negative (spoilage), just follow. Likewise teeth, and 
by extension all other parts of animals and the whole animals themselves, come to 
be because they must; the results, survival due to the positive contribution of the 
teeth and other such parts, or extinction due to the failure to produce a viable 
organism, just follow, without there being any a priori activity for the sake of one 
or the other result. Moreover, the above is perhaps surprisingly maintained by the 
physicalists to be the case both in the original coming-to-be of the first member 
of a given species and in all future comings-to-be of individual members of the 
species. 
                                                 
52 The argument here is clearly external to the physicalist position. They obviously cannot be ex-
pected to propose as an example something that has a nature, since they do not believe that there 
are natures apart from those of the elements. My point here is that, unbeknownst to them, what 
they in fact propose as a model for natural processes is missing essential features of basic natural 
things such as living organisms. Natural organisms are wholes in a way that the phenomenon of 
rainfall simply is not, and this is something that they could have seen. 
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However, the rainfall example fails to accomplish the task for which it was 
selected, that is, to show the plausibility of a physicalist account of natural com-
ing-to-be. First of all, it is not an adequate example of a natural thing. It is one at 
most in a weakened sense. Natural things have internal principles of rest and mo-
tion, which Aristotle calls “nature” in the strict sense; in the case of rain we find no 
one such internal principle.53 It contains a multiplicity of principles. Furthermore, 
natural things have motions that are qualitatively different from those of their 
constituents; this is not the case with rain. 
Next, there is the problem of action for an end. The physicalists’ position 
seems to be founded on a confusion between natural action and human action for 
an end. In the latter case the purpose is explicitly chosen and extrinsic to the agent, 
as a result of which it does not always come about. In the former case, however, 
the end is intrinsically related to the object and necessarily follows if there are no 
external obstacles. In the rainfall example, the suggested end, the growth of wheat, 
is extrinsic to the rain in the strict sense, yet it is expected to take place always. The 
reason for this difficulty, I suggest, is the fact that rain does not have a proper na-
ture and therefore does not have an end in the strict sense. In this the physicalists 
are partially right, though not for the reason they offer. Yet because rainfall is not 
a proper natural thing, it cannot be used in an argument against the existence of 
natural activity for an end. 
We can, however, attribute to rain a nature in a weak sense, and hence ac-
tion for an end in a weak sense. In this sense rain can be said to be for the sake of 
the growth of wheat crops, since it does indeed contribute something to the crops 
in virtue of what it is. Yet this does not help us either, because of the fundamental 
flaw in the example: it is not a natural thing in the proper and strict sense. 
But even if the proponents of natural teleology were to propose rain as 
a genuine example of being for an end, the physicalist counterargument is still of 
no avail to them. They presuppose a symmetry or equivalence between the two 
possible states of affairs that result from rainfall: the growth of wheat and its 
spoilage. Growth and spoilage are, however, clearly not symmetric or equivalent; 
one involves coming-to-be, the other ceasing-to-be. 
                                                 
53 It is clear, of course, that the physicalist does not have to accept Aristotle’s terms of discourse: 
nature, end, substance, essence, actuality. Yet I would claim that he must accept the experimental 
distinctions that underlie these terms. A process such as the rainfall cycle can, up to a certain point, 
be successfully described and accounted for in mechanical and material terms. However, someone 
who, in explaining rain, says nothing about the contribution of rain to the growth of plant life has 
failed to give an adequate account of the reality of rain. This contribution is at least one of its ends, 
though in a weak sense, because rain and the plants it contributes to are distinct substances. 
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Finally, the physicalists’ understanding of activity for an end seems to be 
notably anthropomorphic. They appear to take human goal-directed activity as the 
paradigm of action for an end in general. Only in this context, which is nonethe-
less fundamentally mistaken, does their objection make some sense. 
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